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natural right, his language savors of Roman right, in the manner of the definitions in the Institutes and the Pandects. Fichte cast off this dry method in his system of natural right, but did it in a confused way; while Hegel labored with artistic circumspection, and from the treasury of the German language he coined the purest gold.

## THE PARMENIDES OF PLATO.

By S. H. EMERY, Jr.

[In Quincy and Jacksonville (Illinois) there are two flourishing philosophical clubs that have been prosecuting vigorously the study of Plato. The bravery that attacks Plato, and especially the Parmenides, deserves the highest admiration. Mr. S. H. Emery, Jr., member of the club at Quincy, writes under date of April 21, 1872, as follows; "I have read the first three hypotheses, viz., i. a., i. b., and what *should* be called (it seems to me) i. c., although Jowett includes it in i. b. I make of the first hypothesis: (i. a.) The One considered as indefinite immediate—indeterminable and undetermining is *Nothing*. (i. b.) Of the second: the One considered as self-determining—subject-object—is and is the totality; all the categories are embraced in it. (i. c.) Of the third: the becoming of the One is in eternity, and through all its self-determining it remains self-identical." The following essay is an outline of his view of this "great master-work of ancient dialectic." Its author modestly says: "All I claim at all is—to have seen something of the main purpose of the dialogue." —EDITOR.]

Now that we have finished our *first* attempt to discover the true meaning of this most celebrated Platonic Dialogue, it will be an advantage to review the whole matter and see what we have gained.

As to the *form* of the Dialogue, we find it divided into two main divisions—the first a preliminary discussion between Socrates and Parmenides, which leads easily and naturally to the second part, in which Parmenides gives Socrates an example of the true philosophica lmethod. It has occurred to me (although I will confess that my acquaintance with the early Philosophies is not sufficient to enable me to be *sure* that I am right), that Plato intends by this arrangement of the characters to intimate that the Eleatic Philosophy, legitimately extended, goes deeper than the Socratic teachings.

As to the *matter*, we find the Dialogue devoted wholly to the consideration of Ideas in themselves, or, as Socrates calls them, "Ideas in the abstract."

The main hypothesis of the Dialogue is, "If Abstract Ideas are," and is introduced by Socrates at the very outset. The Absolute in itself having been thus presupposed, the problem is to find the connection between *it* and *existing* things.

The first connection tried is "Participation"—"Things partake of the Ideas." This is soon shown to be inadequate. Parmenides then asks Socrates if he has not found these "Abstract Ideas" by abstracting from existing things; and Socrates says, "Yes." Parmenides then shows that this process leads to an "Infinite Progress," from which Socrates endeavors to escape by inquiring if the Ideas may not be *subjective* only; that is, mere generalizations, without any real being for their ground—an entire relinquishing of Ideas as real essence; but Parmenides makes him admit that there cannot be cognitions without a something cognized, and this something is the *Idea*. Socrates then substitutes "Assimilation" for "Participation." Parmenides shows that this also leads to an "Infinite Progress," and then proceeds to explain to Socrates that his method is inadequate; that if Ideas are posited as distinct from (separated and apart from) existing things, and we attempt to find a connection in this external way, we shall never accomplish anything,—but Ideas must be contemplated in their own proper movement, by the true Dialectic method. I believe that this first part of the Dialogue is intended by Plato to present and refute possible erroneous views of the "Platonic Ideas," which would assume them as set off somewhere—isolated from existing things by a chasm which cannot be bridged.

The second part shows us the "Platonic Ideas" in their true aspect. The One and the Many are considered in two series of hypotheses—nine in all. In the first series are developed the consequences which follow from the hypothesis, "If the One is"; and in the second series are developed the consequences which follow from the hypothesis, "If the One is not." This division into nine hypotheses is really only a matter of form, as the whole content is actually developed from the hypothesis, "If One is."

Let us now examine this second part of the Dialogue in detail.

First, "If One is, the One cannot be Many." There follows, then :

- "The One is not a whole and will not have parts.
- "The One is unlimited.
- "The One is formless.
- "The One cannot be in any place.
- "The One can neither have rest nor motion.
- "The One is neither the same nor other in relation to itself or other.
- "The One can neither be older nor younger than itself, nor of the same age with itself.
- "Therefore the One does not partake of Time, and is not in any time.
- "And if not of Time, then not of Being.

"Then the One *is* not and is not One, and is neither named, nor uttered, nor conceived, nor known; nor does anything that is, perceive One." So the One that cannot be Many is disposed of, and the outcome is plain. The Abstract—Indeterminate—Undeterminable—One—is *nothing*—can be neither known nor uttered.

Let us make a fresh start, then, from the hypothesis :

"If One is."

There follows, then :

- "One partakes of Being.
- "One becomes infinite in number.
- "If One is, number is.
- "One broken up into parts by existence must be infinite Many.
- "One partakes of a figure.
- "One is in itself and in Other.
- "One is the same with itself and Others.
- "One is other than itself and Others.
- "One is both like and unlike Others.
- "One is both like and unlike itself.
- "One touches and does not touch itself and Others.
- "One is equal to and greater and less than itself and Others.
- "One is equal to and more and less in number than itself and Others.
- "One is and becomes older and younger than itself and Others.
- "One neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself and Others."

This, then, is the One which *is*—the Self-determining One—which includes all Categories and is Many as well as One. In the first consideration, the One is viewed in its abstract identity and the attempt is made to hold fast to that, but it is useless.

The next hypothesis unites the two first: "If One is both One and Many, and neither One nor Many"—that is, If One considered in its whole truth is both One and Many, and held in indefinite immediateness is neither One nor Many—then the One becomes: The becoming of the One in its various forms (some of which are specified) is not in Time but in Eternity, and in its becoming the One remains self-identical.

"These, then, are the affections of the One."

Could there be a more complete statement of the One? The One *is* in eternal becoming, remaining self-identical.

The fourth hypothesis, "If One is, what will happen to the Many?" portrays the true character of the Being: *For-Itself* of the One. The Others are shown to be infinite in their ground, but finite in their particularity; that is, the *For-Itself* Being of the One is infinite variety posited in individual things. The categories which are potential in the One *exist* in the Others, and the Others are a complete image of the One; but it must be always particularly borne in mind that the Others are *not* the One; that back of the *created* is the *Creator*.

The fifth hypothesis shows the result of attempting to separate the Others from the One, and, as might be expected, they prove to be nothing.

The result of the first series of hypotheses is, therefore, that—The One, when truly considered, is all things; when otherwise considered, is nothing; and the others are similarly affected.

The first hypothesis of the second series is, "If One is not." Upon consideration, it appears that this is something quite different from an absolute denial of Being to the One. As we proceed, we find that it is a consideration of the One which *is* from the side of its Being-In-Other. We see, first, that

there is a knowledge of One ; then that the One is different from the Others and has determinate quality.

We are considering the One on the side of *variety*, not of *unity* ; but we find that, when so considered, the One has Likeness, Unlikeness, Greatness, Smallness, Equality, Inequality, Motion, Rest, &c. We also find that Non-Being is as necessary to the One as Being, neither being complete without the other. We find that the One, when it is moved, is changed, and we recognize the "Finite sphere," Origin, and Decease ; but we see also that the change is within the One—that it includes Life and Death—so that it comes into being and perishes, and neither "comes into being nor perishes."

The seventh hypothesis is the same as the sixth, but the "*not*" is accepted as absolute denial of being. The conclusion is soon reached, and from this point of view is inevitable, viz.: The One which is not, has and is nothing at all.

The eighth hypothesis is, "If One is not, what becomes of the Others?" This leads to a consideration of the Others in themselves ; that is, it is an attempt similar to that of the (so called) natural philosophers, who investigate phenomena from the phenomenal side, pretending ignorance of the ground on which they depend. We find, however, that before we have proceeded far the One appears, and that all the categories which we found to *exist* in the Others when we considered them truly—that is, from the side of the *Being* of the One—now *appear* to exist in them when considered from the phenomenal side ; and we find further, when we come to the ninth hypothesis (which bears the same relation to the eighth that the seventh bears to the sixth), that, no matter how hard we may *try* to leave the One out of our consideration, if we could succeed in our attempt, nothing would be left. It is only the immanent presence of the One in its Not-Being which enables the Others to even *appear* ; for, "If One is not, nothing is."

As a summing up of the whole content, we find (to use Hegel's words): "The One, whether it *is* or is *not*, is the *Many* as well as it *itself*, and in relation to *another* as well

as for *itself*—all throughout is *not* as well as *is*; it *appears* and does *not* appear.” Or: The One is the Totality—All that *is*—Being and Non-Being—One and Many.

NOTE.—I make a distinction between “Being” and “Existence,” which I think was suggested to me by the “Secret of Hegel.”

## BOOK NOTICES.

*The Sciences of Nature versus the Science of Man: A Plea for the Science of Man.* By Noah Porter, LL.D. New York: Dodd & Mead. 1871.

Portions of this essay were delivered as an address before the societies of the Phi Beta Kappa at Harvard and Trinity Colleges, in 1871.

Dr. Porter has done valiant service in the cause of Philosophy in two directions. First, against the Sir William Hamilton school he has contended in favor of the capacity of thought to solve the problems that arise in Consciousness; second, against the modern materialistic and especially the Positivist school he contends for the transcendent interest of Mind over matter, and for its substantiality as compared with the “fleeting shows of sense.” In no previous work of his, however, have we seen so successful a vindication of the spiritual over the sensuous as in the little book named above. He begins his essay with a true art-instinct, starting from the summit of modern physical science and inquiring into the pre-suppositions of its structure.

“Science, objectively viewed, is universally conceived as *related knowledge*. Those who limit it most narrowly, assert that it gives us phenomena connected by relations. But facts or phenomena do not connect themselves.” “Whence do these relations—these mystic bonds of science—proceed? The interpreting mind does, in some sense, find them already in its hands. Whether they are evolved from its own experience as the progressive acquisitions of association, that cannot be broken, as Mill, Bain and Spencer would teach us; whether, like a mystic veil, they are thrown over the otherwise chaotic phenomena of both matter and spirit by the formative energy of man, as Kant confidently suggests; or whether they are at once the conditions of thought to man because they are conditions of being in nature and God, as the wit and common sense and the research of the profoundest philosophy declare, these relations must, in the study of nature, be confidently applied by man as fast and as far as the chaos which bewilders the infant and overawes the savage, is thought into a cosmos by man’s interpreting reason.” “Briefly, *an inductive science of nature presupposes a science of induction, and a science of induction presupposes a science of man.*”

“Before Socrates, the physics were as crude as the metaphysics. Both alike were vain guess-work founded on hasty resemblances more rudely interpreted and generalized. From such speculations about matter and